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Credit in the Body of Christ (Northern France, 1300-1600) 
Tyler Lange 
 
This project began when I encountered an accusation made in 1496 in a jurisdictional dis-
pute between the duke of Orl￩ans and the bishop of Orl￩ans. The king’s attorney told the 
Parlement of Paris how “a sergeant found a certain person in the environs of Orléans with a 
full basket of blank citations with which to vex and trouble a bunch of poor winegrowers. 
When he seized the citations, he was cited and then excommunicated,” joining what the 
duke’s attorney believed were “twelve or fourteen thousand” excommunicates from whom the 
bishop sought to profit through the fees for sealing their absolutions.
1 I later encountered 
further accusations that bishops had made a “business” or marchandise of ecclesiastical 
justice, notably against the bishop of Angers in the mid-1520s and against the archbishop of 
Besançon in the 1570s.
2 
All of these episodes point to a practice that is nearly imperceptible to historians because the 
bulk of evidence for it is to be found in the interstices of the beaten paths of legal and social 
history and because it mixes economic and religious matters in a strikingly unfamiliar man-
ner. From the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, excommunication for debt offered ordinary 
people an economical, efficacious enforcement mechanism for small-scale, daily, unwritten 
credit. At the same time, the practice offered holders of ecclesiastical jurisdiction an im-
portant opportunity to round out their incomes, particularly in the difficult fifteenth century. My 
sources come mostly from Northern France, though the practice appears to have existed 
across the continent. From one perspective, the practice was a grave abuse by which the 
Church sold its salvific magic to creditors. From another, the practice encouraged charitable, 
ostensibly interest-free lending within the Body of Christ and provided a mechanism of en-
forcement for credit that lacked any written proof or that was too minor to be worth pursuing 
in royal courts. This transitional practice reveals a level of credit below that of the letters of 
change, annuities secured on real property, or written obligations beloved of economic histo-
rians and historians of banking. Though the excellent works of Craig Muldrew and Laurence 
Fontaine, among others, have illuminated credit in the early modern world, the type of credit 
that most often gave rise to excommunications for debt is often only visible through this prac-
tice – a practice that illuminates the religious, social, and economic transformations of the 
sixteenth century. Studying the practice casts light on the transition from the face-to-face, 
local economies of the high Middle Ages to the regional economies of the early modern peri-
od, on how the Reformation shaped early modern regimes of credit, and on how the disap-
pearance of ecclesiastical civil justice facilitated the emergence of early modern juridically 
sovereign territories. 
 
Credit 
Late medieval Europeans swam in a sea of credit. This was necessary, given the lack of any 
sort of formalized credit available to the very poorest and the chronic scarcity and deprecia-
                                                           
1 Archives nationales de France (henceforth AN), Paris, X
2a61, 256v, 250v. 
2 An accusation thrown at the bishop of Angers in 1525 by the king of France’s prosecutor: AN, X
1a4876, 148v-
149v. For the Angers case, see Tyler Lange, The First French Reformation: Religious Reform and the Origins of 
the Old Regime, Cambridge, forthcoming 2014, ch. 4 § I; for Besan￧on, see Lucien Febvre, L’application du Con-
cile de Trente et l’excommunication pour dettes en Franche-Comté, in: Revue historique 103 (1910), S. 225-247, 
and 104 (1910), S. 1-39, at 3, 8. 3 
 
tion of minor coinage.
3 This was also a product of choice, as Panurge highlights in the Tiers 
Livre of Fran￧ois Rabelais first published in 1546: “‘But when, asked Pantagruel, will you be 
free of debt? …Panurge responded: ‘God help me from ever being free of debt. I’d never 
again find anyone to lend me a penny.’” Panurge then justified this choice on a more theoret-
ical basis: “‘…all my life, I’ve imagined debt as the link between Heaven and earth, as the 
sole sustenance of humanity – without which all humans would die It is perhaps the uni-
verse’s great soul that, acording to the philosophers, gives life to all things.’” For this fictional 
giant, credit was what kept the world in motion. It even encouraged affection and charity 
among men, for whom, Panurge speculated, but one’s creditors would wake every morning 
to pray God for one’s well-being and success?
4 Credit reconciled self-interest and the greater 
good. Indebtedness played the role assigned to the desires for consumption and for profit by 
Bernard Mandeville and Adam Smith in the eighteenth century – with the important difference 
that late medieval society was imagined as the Body of Christ composed of sinful believers 
striving for salvation, rather than as a polity composed of self-interested citizens. 
I propose a fourfold thought experiment. First, imagine that your daily transactions were 
made on credit – and not the relatively standardized form offered by the credit card, for pre-
modern Europeans lived in a monetized but cash-poor world in which the wealthy hoarded 
and kings debased valuable coins, and in which the small-denomination specie required for 
daily transactions was scarce. Daily life was a continuous negotiation for credit, the moneti-
zation of honor and reputation that permitted survival.
5 Kings, landlords, bankers, merchants, 
artisans, and farmers ran their enterprises on the expectation of future taxes, dues, and prof-
its. Rather than paying for goods or services at the time of delivery, pre-modern Europeans 
often reckoned-up periodically with purveyors and with servants, whether quarterly, semi-
annually, or annually. With the local ale-wife or with a trusted servant, the balance could be 
carried over to the next quarter or year. Balances were negotiable, as records of excom-
municates sometimes specify which (orally-contracted!) debts had been ceded to a third par-
ty probably in payment of other debts.
6 With an unreliable purveyor or fired servant, one 
might demand or withhold the money owed, depending on the plausibility of legal recourse. 
Only the tax collector usually required immediate payment in cash. As a result, outstanding 
balances proliferated, with many being creditor and debtor at once to many different part-
ners. Much of this credit was oral, given the expense of written obligations. Second, imagine 
that you believed in an afterlife that could only be attained through the sacraments of Holy 
Mother Church. Third, know that Holy Mother Church possessed a system of courts and that 
                                                           
3 Thomas J. Sargent and François R. Velde, The Big Problem of Small Change, Princeton, 2002; Laurence Fon-
taine, L’Economie morale: Pauvret￩, cr￩dit et confiance dans l’Europe pr￩industrielle, Paris, 2008; Craig Muldrew, 
The Economy of Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early Modern England, New York, 
1998; M. Berthe (Hg.), Endettement Paysan et Cr￩dit Rural dans l’Europe m￩di￩vale et moderne: Actes des 
XVIIes Journ￩es d’Histoire de l’Abbaye de Flaran, Toulouse, 1998; Martha Howell, Commerce Before Capitalism 
in Europe, 1300-1600, Cambridge, 2010. 
4 François Rabelais, Gargantua et Pantagruel, bk. III, ch. 3: « ‘Mais, demanda Pantagruel, quand serez vous hors 
de debtes?’ …respondit Panurge… ‘Dieu me garde d’en estre hors. Plus lors ne trouverois qui un denier me pres-
tast. …toute ma vie, je n’aye estim￩ debtes estre comme une connexion et colligence des cieulx et terre, un en-
tretenement unique de l’humain lignaige, je dis sans lequel bien tost tous humains periroient; estre par adventure 
celle grande ame de l’univers, laquelle, selon les academicques, toutes choses vivifie’ ». 
5 Thomas V. Cohen explores this bargaining for credit (fede) in Three Forms of Jeopardy: Honor, Pain, and Truth-
Telling in a Sixteenth-Century Italian Courtroom, in: Sixteenth-Century Journal 39:4 (1998), S. 975-998. 
6 Archives départementales de la Seine-Maritime, Rouen (henceforth ADSM), G 5273, Register of Excommuni-
cates in the Officiality of Montivilliers, 1499-1530, f. 27: “Dominus Johannes du bois presbyter suspensus a divinis 
pro judicato somme vi l xii s t contra Ricardum vymart jus cessionis habentem a vigore capitaine de die xxi.ma 
mensis octobris anno v
c xv.” Priests were prohibited from celebrating the sacraments. What commerce was to 
laymen, the sacraments were to priests: their livelihood. 4 
 
your creditor chose not to pursue you in a civil court but to make your salvation depend on 
paying up. Fourth, be aware that you borrowed seed corn, grain for subsistence, or perhaps 
the raw materials of your craft. As Joseph Stiglitz recently noted, growth in the United States 
in the decade before 2007 was “reliant on the bottom 80 percent consuming about 110 per-
cent of their income.”
7 Studies of pre-modern indebtedness suggest that unsustainably small 
farms, slow technological progress, and predatory leases and loans meant that a similar pro-
portion of pre-modern Europeans had to borrow – not to consume but to survive.
8 Since it 
appears that excommunication for debt constituted a considerable proportion of the activity of 
church courts, at least in certain areas, in the years before the Reformation, we must exam-
ine how the institution that was supposed to provide the means of salvation came to withhold 
them from those who borrowed to live. 
 
Church Courts and the Rituals of Excommunication 
Examining excommunication for debt – breaks in the web of lending that bound together late 
medieval society – suggests a post-Revisionist view of the Reformation in which the tension 
between “reform” and “corruption” shaped the believer’s day-to-day experience of the Chris-
tian faith. It also suggests how that tension might have structured economic life or market 
activity. Late medieval “folklorized” Christianity, in which rituals and festivals of putatively 
pagan origin coexisted with pieties foreshadowing those of the Protestant and Catholic 
Reformations, centered on securing real outcomes such as salvation, protection from plague, 
or a good harvest through the intercession of saints and through the performance of meritori-
ous ritual actions including repetitive daily prayers, bodily mortification, pilgrimages, and gifts 
to the Church.
9 The faith of the average Christian in the century before the Reformation was 
colorful, concrete, active, and commonsense. The goals of worldly and eternal salvation were 
clear. Sins were clear. Acceptable forms of penance were clear. Whether the sinner could 
ever atone sufficiently for his sins was not, hence the explosive growth in masses for the 
dead and similar devotions evident in certain regions.
10 Though the believer was unsure that 
he could ever do enough, he could be sure that he would always be able to access the 
Church’s always-effective sacraments. Or would he? 
The faithful who sought security in this world and salvation in the next were members of the 
institution administered by the successors of Saint Peter and the apostles. Through its mo-
nopoly of the administration of the sacraments, the hierarchical Church was the necessary 
intermediary for Christians seeking salvation. The first gatekeeper to the sacraments was the 
parish priest who administered baptism, the annual confession and Eucharist required since 
1215, and the viaticum that guaranteed a dying believer’s chance at salvation. While the be-
liever had to have recourse to a priest for the sacraments, both the priest and the believer 
had to be authorized to administer and to receive them. The second gate-keeper was there-
fore the official, the judge to whom bishops or other holders of ecclesiastical jurisdiction had 
by the late medieval period across Europe confided the power to judge cases concerning 
clerics, ecclesiastical property, marriage, wills, oaths and contracts, heresy, and matters 
                                                           
7 Joseph Stiglitz, Inequality is Holding Back the Recovery, NYT, January 20, 2013. 
8 Olwen Hufton, The Poor of Eighteenth-Century France, Oxford, 1988; Fontaine, L’Economie morale; Jean Jac-
quart, L’endettement paysan et le cr￩dit dans les campagnes de la France moderne, in: Berthe (Hg.), Endette-
ment paysan et crédit rural, S. 283-298. 
9 Bob Scribner, Ritual and Popular Religion in Catholic Germany at the Time of the Reformation, in: Popular Cul-
ture and Popular Movements in Reformation Germany, London, 1987, S. 17-47. 
10 Carlos Eire, From Madrid to Purgatory: The Art and Craft of Dying in Sixteenth-Century Spain, Cambridge, 
1995; Jacques Chiffoleau, La comptabilité de l'au-delà. Les hommes, la mort et la religion dans la région d'Avi-
gnon à la fin du Moyen Age (vers 1320-vers 1480), Rome, 1980. 5 
 
concerning participation in and exclusion from the sacraments.
11 Litigants could also choose 
to bring civil cases before the official. In late medieval Paris, there existed the officialités of 
the bishop, of the chapter, of the grand archdeacon, and of the major exempt monasteries. In 
the diocese of Grenoble, an additional official heard cases from deaneries belonging to the 
duke of Savoy. When the archdeacon, episcopal vicar, or the bishop himself inspected and 
judged parishes, priests, and parishioners on visitation, he became the gatekeeper. 
In a Church structured by the power to judge (potestas jurisdictionis), in contradistinction to 
priests’ sacramental power (potestas ordinis),
12 the official ordinarily wielded the power of the 
keys, the power to exclude and include Christians among the number of the saved by deny-
ing access to the sacraments. While the parish priest wielded this power in confession, in 
what was called “the internal forum” or “the court of conscience,” ecclesiastical judges wield-
ed this all-important power in “the external forum” or “judicial forum” of ecclesiastical tribu-
nals. The official captured the essence of the late medieval Church, a juridical organization in 
which, to use the words of Paravy, receiving the Eucharist was not so much a sign of mem-
bership in a community but a “privilege” granted by a legal authority.
13 Lay religious experi-
ence focused instead on exchange of the “pax” following the Lord’s Prayer, on the adoration 
of the Eucharist at the elevation, and on the distribution of blessed bread.
14 The concept of 
“communion-as-privilege” helps to explain why Jacques Toussaert interpreted the failure of 
many fifteenth-century residents of maritime Flanders to perform their Easter communion as 
reflecting “abstainers” voluntarily skipping the sacrament or justly excluded for unrepented 
sins.
15 In fact, a parishioner had to gain the privilege of his or her Easter communion by con-
fessing, securing absolution, and performing the required penance, a series of requirements 
that could only be accomplished if the believer had not been excommunicated. The sacra-
ments had also to be available generally, as they were not when a territory was placed under 
interdict, in what was essentially a sacramental embargo.
16 Toussaert’s Flemish “veritable 
pagans” practiced a juridicized Christianity in which their sins had been transformed into 
crimes to be judged.
17 The late medieval Church, built up since the millennium through an 
increasingly Romanized canon law, an increasingly imperial papacy, and an increasingly 
legally-minded clergy, and directed by lawyer-popes and lawyer-bishops, tended to see itself 
and to operate as a jurisdictional entity.
18 Staffed by ecclesiastical judges, prosecutors, law-
                                                           
11 Paul Fournier, Les officialités au Moyen Âge, Paris, 1880; Anne Lefebvre-Teillard, Les officialités à la veille du 
concile de Trente, Paris, 1973; V￩ronique Beaulande, Le malheur d’￪tre exclu? Excommunication, r￩conciliation 
et société à la fin du Moyen Âge, Paris, 2006. 
12 Laurent Villemin, Pouvoir d’ordre et pouvoir de juridiction: Histoire th￩ologique de leur distinction, Paris, 2003. 
13 Pierette Paravy, De la chrétienté romaine à la Réforme en Dauphiné. Évêques, fidèles et déviants (vers 1340-
vers 1530), Rome, 1993, S. 484, 751. 
14 John Bossy, The Mass as a Social Institution, in: Past and Present 100 (Aug. 1983), S. 29-61; Virginia Rein-
burg, Liturgy and the Laity in Late Medieval and Reformation France, in: Sixteenth Century Journal 23:3 (Autumn, 
1992), S. 526-547; Eamon Duffy, The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England 1400-1580, New 
Haven, 1992. 
15 Jacques Toussaert, Le sentiment religieux en Flandre à la fin du Moyen Âge, Paris, 1963, S. 440-443. 
16 Elisabeth Vodola, Excommunication in the Middle Ages, Berkeley, 1986; Peter D. Clarke, The Interdict in the 
Thirteenth Century: A Question of Collective Guilt, Oxford, 2007. 
17 Laurent Mayali, “‘Duo erunt in carne una’ and the Medieval Canonists,” in: Iuris Historia: Liber Amicorum Gero 
Dolezalek, Berkeley, 2008, S. 161-175. 
18 Lange, The First French Reformation, Ch. 1, § I-II; Gabriel Le Bras, Les origines canoniques du droit adminis-
tratif, in: L’￩volution du droit public: Études en l’honneur d’Achille Mestre, Paris, 1956, S. 395-412; Pierre Le-
gendre, Du droit privé au droit public: Nouvelles observations sur le mandat chez les canonistes classiques, in: 
M￩moires de la Soci￩t￩ pour l’Histoire du Droit et des Institutions des anciens pays bourguignons, comtois et 
romands 30e Fascicule (1970-1971), S. 7-35; Laurent Mayali, Romanitas and Medieval Jurisprudence, in: Lex et 
Romanitas: Essays for Alan Watson, Berkeley, 2000, S. 121-138. 6 
 
yers, and notaries, governed by a code of laws and series of precedents, and organized ac-
cording to an appellate hierarchy, church courts manifested this juridicized Christianity less 
by admonishing Christians of their sins than by prosecuting legal subjects for their crimes. 
Excommunication for debt confirmed that credit was at once a moral, social, and economic 
quantity that reflected the state of one’s soul, one’s social status, and one’s economic posi-
tion. It mobilized the sanctions of the Church to repair the wounded credit of a lender, seller, 
or other aggrieved party. To take an example from late medieval Paris, Agnesot, wife of Jean 
de La Court, paid 4 deniers parisis (5 d.t.) in court costs on 31 July 1385 to have the cleric 
Jean Sassier sentenced to pay her 2 francs (2 l. 8 s.t.) for calling her a whore in court. On 19 
August, now authorized to act independently in court by her husband, she paid 8 d. par. (10 
d.t.) to have Sassier warned that he could be excommunicated for his debt. On 28 August, 
Sassier promised to pay. On 2 September, Agnesot proposed to have Sassier excommuni-
cated for nonpayment. The official convened them for further arguments, for which she and 
he each paid 8 d. par. (10 d.t.). On 4 September, the official ordered him to pay within the 
week or be excommunicated. On 26 September, Agnesot came to court to confirm that he 
had paid.
19 Sassier was not excommunicated. For 20 d.p. (25 d.t.), Agnesot repaired her 
credit and received 2 francs (2 l. 8 s.t.). Christophe d’Auxerre, on the other hand, to draw 
another example from Paris, was excommunicated at the request of Colin de Grandchamp 
for an unpaid debt of 4 francs, 14 sous par. (5 l. 16 s. 10 d.t.) recognized by the Châtelet, the 
lowest level of royal justice in Paris, and for court costs of 15 s. par. (18 s.t.). However, on 19 
June 1387, Christophe came before the official of Paris with a payment plan, paying 12 d. 
par. (14 d.t.) for a conditional absolution.
20 
Credit, in short, was a comprehensive, non-numerical evaluation of the place of someone 
within society. In the late Middle Ages, society was – it was not just imagined to be – the 
Body of Christ. Christians were bound not only to perform the duties requisite to salvation, 
minimally, annual confession and reception of the Eucharist, but to preserve the bonds of 
charity with their fellows. Charity could manifest itself as forgiveness, particularly of insults or 
quarrels, or as charitable, interest-free lending. If a believer failed to repay such a loan, this 
uncharitable act warranted his exclusion from the Body of Christ. Had Christophe d’Auxerre 
failed to offer a payment plan to his creditor, his excommunication would have proceeded to 
what were called its aggravation and the reaggravation. Warnings or monitions, excommuni-
cations, aggravations, and reaggravations were delivered personally or announced during 
the main Sunday mass to the accompaniment of liturgical curses. 
The collections of legal templates known as formularies illustrate how the rituals of excom-
munication mark progressive exclusion from the religious and economic community. A simple 
excommunication often passed without ceremony. Having failed to respond to a canonical 
summons, the delinquent was denounced as excommunicate at the Sunday parish mass and 
his name was entered into the officiality’s register of excommunicates. If this failed to bring 
about the desired effect, the officiality proceeded to more elaborate formulas. Under its “ru-
bric on excommunications,” the 1474 Style of the Officiality of the Abbey of Corbie provided 
the most explicit progression of ceremonial curses. The first excommunication is a simple 
injunction to parish priests in a case explicitly of debt: 
The Official of Corbie greets the curate or priest of X. We command you to announce 
or to have announced the sentence of excommunication pronounced by us against 
                                                           
19 Joseph Petit (Hg.), Registre des Causes Civiles de l’Officialit￩ Épiscopale de Paris, 1384-1387, Paris, 1919, S. 
166, 177, 181-182, 184, 186, 194. I will give all amounts also converted into livres, sous, and deniers tournois. 
20 Petit, Registre, 484. 7 
 
Peter N for debt at the request of John N openly and solemnly in your church and to 
notify us of this if necessary. 
The second enjoined the priest to repeat the sentence “as many times as you shall celebrate 
the divine office on Sundays, feasts, and weekdays,” while ringing the church bells and ex-
tinguishing candles. The third asked the priest to command that the obdurate excommuni-
cate be shunned. The priest was to: 
forbid all your parishioners on pain of excommunication lest they should presume 
consciously to communicate with the excommunicate as long as he should remain 
under sentence of excommunication with respect to food, drink, the village oven, the 
mill, fire, water, socializing, chatting, working, selling, paying, sitting, walking, greeting 
him, entering his house, eating, drinking, selling or giving him bread, wine, meat, fish, 
or other of life’s necessities, or any other act. 
The fourth added that no work could be done for the excommunicate and that his family had 
to be shunned as well. The fifth – entitled “be they ruined” (confundantur) – provided that the 
“unrepentant” (animo indurato) man who “feared not the [power of the] keys” (non formidat 
claves) be denounced twice at vespers and thrice at mass with ringing bells, candles lit then 
extinguished, and the clergy prostrate. Tradesmen were commanded not to trade with him or 
his family.
21 A matter of debt, certainly a breach of the bonds of credit that bound individuals 
to each other, became a matter of “contempt of Holy Mother Church” and led to the exclusion 
of the excommunicate and his family from the community of those seeking salvation through 
Holy Mother Church, which was also the economic community within which the excommuni-
cate subsisted. 
The liturgical curses deployed against excommunicates were modeled after those used in 
the high Middle Ages to defend church property.
22 These forms survived into the early mod-
ern period, explicitly in matters of debt.
23 Designed to terrify, to shame, and to effect the 
death and damnation of the excommunicate, these liturgical curses were intensifications of a 
simple excommunication. The title of a “form of a letter of malediction” from Marseilles c. 
1490 recalls the Middle English meaning of the verb “cursen” as “to excommunicate.”
24 It 
provides that the priest was to announce the excommunicate’s pertinacity at mass. Then, 
“with acolyte, in surplice and stole, carrying a cross and holy water, he was go to the church 
door singing Psalm 108 to the end and throwing three stones from the church door in sign of 
                                                           
21 Bibiothèque nationale de France (henceforth BnF), Paris, ms lat 18371, f. 66-68: “Officialis corbeiensis curato 
vel presbitero tali salutem mandamus vobis quatenus sentenciam excommunicacionis a nobis latam in petrum N 
pro debito occasione et ad instantiam johannis N palam presencie et solemniter in plena ecclesia vestra immo-
netis au immonari faciatis et de hoc nobis rescripbatis si opus sit. Datum etc. … 
  Ut supra usque palam presencie et solemniter in plena ecclesia vestra singulis diebus dominicis festivis et non 
festivis candellis accensis campanis pulsantis tociens quociens voc divina celebrabitis officia innovatis aut innova-
ri faciatis et de hoc nos certificetis. … 
  Ut supra usque palam presensie ut et sicut r.a innovetis aut innovari faciatis inhiben omnibus et singulis parro-
chianis vestris in generali ne quis ipsorum sub pena excommunicacionis cum dicto vel dicta sic excommunicato 
quamdiu in dicta excommunicacionis sentencia permanserit cibo potu furno molendino ygne aqua societate lo-
quelle curendo vendendo reddendo sedendo scando eum salutando domum suam intrando comedendo bibendo 
panem vinum carnes pisces et alia vite necessaria cedendo vendendo vel administrando aut alio aliq actu legiti-
mo scienter participare presumat Et de hoc etc.” 
22 Lester K. Little, Benedictine Maledictions: Liturgical Cursing in Romanesque France, Ithaca, 1993. 
23 See the cited manuscript formularies, Roger Aubenas (Hg.), Recueil de lettres des officialités de Marseille et 
d’Aix (XIVe-XVe siècle), Paris, 1937, and Jacques Éveillon, Traité des excommunications et monitoires. Avec la 
maniere de publier, executer, et fulminer toutes sortes de Monitoire, et excommunications, Paris, 1672), S. 374-
384. 
24 Little, Benedictine Maledictions, S. 44. 8 
 
the eternal curse that God placed on Dathan and Abiron, whom the earth swallowed alive.”
25 
According to the late sixteenth-century statutes of the Norman diocese of Évreux, a coffin 
draped “as if there were a dead man to bury” surrounded by candles and a basin of holy wa-
ter was placed before the pulpit. The excommunication was fulminated, the candles extin-
guished, the coffin aspersed, and the congregation encouraged “to weep for the excommuni-
cate as if he were truly dead.” A dry funeral, so to speak. In the Southern French diocese of 
Périgueux, the instigator of the excommunication paid to bring a coffin to the church door. 
After Sunday’s high mass, the priest came with two acolytes in liturgical garb to sing Psalm 
108 while the church bells rang. They then burnt the coffin, each casting six stones at it. In 
the nearby dioceses of Vienne, Embrun, Grenoble, Avignon, and apparently those of Lyon 
and Augsburg, the ceremony similarly involved ringing church bells, extinguishing candles, 
overturning the processional cross, singing the response Revelabunt celi (based on Job 20-
21), the antiphon Media vita, and Psalm 108, and throwing three stones from the church 
door.
26 In sum, at the paid request of a creditor or other offended party, the clergy launched 
curses designed to kill and to damn the debtor or other offender. 
The chosen psalm, 108 in the Vulgate, 109 in modern editions, illuminates the whole cere-
mony. It is a counter-curse invoking Jehovah against an enemy: 
  …Set thou a wicked man over him: and let Satan stand at his right hand. 
When he shall be judged, let him be condemned: and let his prayer become sin. 
  Let his days be few; let another take his office. 
  Let his children be fatherless, and his wife a widow. 
  Let his children be continually vagabonds, and beg… 
  Let the usurer (V foenerator, AV extortioner) catch all that he hath... (6-11) 
The debtor is to be identified with a “sinner” and “deceiver” (v. 2) to be cursed, while his cred-
itor is to be identified with the “poor man with contrite heart” (v. 17), the “suffering poor man” 
with “anxiety in his breast” and “knees weakened from fasting” (v. 22-23). The creditor asks 
God to stand “at the right hand of the poor man, to save my soul from my persecutors” (v. 
31). Use of this text puts the debtor in the place of persecutor, and his creditor in the place of 
the righteous, powerless poor man whom the Church was supposed to aid. No one could 
mistake who the victim was, for the Marseille formulary specified that the object of the letter 
had been “excommunicated, aggravated, and reaggravated… at the request of such a per-
son from such a place.”
27 With the invocation of Dathan and Abiron, punished for their revolt 
against Moses’s priestly authority, the ceremony affirmed that the Church would protect 
“poor,” powerless creditors with its magic. These texts help us to make sense of a practice 
that is, to our sensibilities, a gross abuse. To wit, excommunication for debt punished the 
                                                           
25 Aubenas, Recueil, II: 57-58. The psalm title given as Deus laudem mean ne carceris surely an error for 
tacueris. 
26 Éveillon, Traité, S. 378. For Revelabunt celi: “The heavens shall disclose the iniquity of Judas and the earth 
shall rise up against him and his sin shall be manifest in the day of the Lord’s wrath with those who said to the 
Lord God, ‘Leave us, we do not wish knowledge of your ways’” (my translation from the University of Waterloo’s 
Cantus database of Gregorian chant, where the text is found as early as 980 in a manuscript from Saint-Gall and 
as late as 1580 in an antiphonary from Augsburg: http://cantusdatabase.org/id/007543). For Media vita, “In the 
midst of life we are already in death, / From whom can we seek help except you, Lord, / Who on account of our 
sins is rightly angered? / Holy God, holy strong, holy and merciful Savior, / Deliver us not to bitter death” (Little, 
Benedictine Maledictions, S. 237). This tradition is confirmed by the inclusion of this psalm, response, and anti-
phon in an early sixteenth-century manuscript of liturgical music from Lyon: Fiona Shand, A New Continental 
Source of a Fifteenth-Century English Mass, in: Music & Letters 88: 3 (2007), S. 405-419, 406, note 3. 
27 Aubenas, Recueil, II: 58. 9 
 
failure to repay a charitable loan that constituted an insult to the community and thus an in-
sult to Christ’s Body. 
The creditors who sought to exclude their debtors from Heaven were not, at least in the rec-
ord, usurers. Lenders never portrayed themselves and church courts never recorded them as 
lending at interest. Since much medieval lending was disguised as a property transfer or the 
recompense for effort, risk, or opportunity, creditors simply took their places alongside, say, 
the priest Mathieu de Oisy to whom Copin de Sarcelles owed 46 s. par. (55s. 2 d.t.) for a 
gray horse bought in 1387.
28 Legally, they were wounded parties, unpaid sellers or service-
providers, as many of the considerable number of believers at least temporally denied the 
sacraments through the working of ecclesiastical courts undoubtedly were. Assuming house-
holds of four persons, excommunication touched 6.5 to 24% of households in the archdea-
conry of Paris between 1426 and 1439.
29 In Toussaert’s Flanders, around 1450 each parish 
had an average of 35.6 excommunicate parishioners in villages of at the most a couple of 
hundred residents.
30 At Beauvais, for instance, the Official’s accounts from 1480 to 1487 
specify the cause for 191 of 234 excommunications, of which 176 concern nonpayment of 
debts. Similarly, the Official of the Abbey of Corbie noted 142 excommunications in 1531, of 
which 116 were for debt and 10 for unpaid judicial fines or court costs.
31 In the Dauphiné, 
during roughly the same period up to 25% of the heads of households in some villages were 
excommunicated for debts.
32 While priests commonly – though not always – absolved these 
unfortunates on their deathbeds and bishops sometimes granted temporary absolutions so 
that excommunicates could make their Easter communion, over time the banalization of such 
punishments made the Church seem to be the instrument of creditors – particularly when the 
priest withheld absolution from a dying man or woman, condemning him or her to burial in 
unconsecrated ground and perhaps to eternal damnation.
33 That in 1446 the curé of Varces 
in the Dauphiné complained to his bishop that he spent most of his time at mass reading 
citations and sentences of excommunication, that legal costs could double the amount of a 
debt, that in 1447 the debts of the excommunicates at Les Adrets in the Dauphiné were as 
much as the village’s annual taxes, that twenty-five percent of the letters in a formulary com-
                                                           
28 Petit, Registre, S. 421. On such forms of lending, Bernard Schnapper, Les rentes au XVIe si￨cle: Histoire d’un 
instrument de crédit, Paris, 1957. 
29 AN Z
1o17, Register of Excommunicates in the Archdeaconry of Paris, 1426-1439. This is an assumption based 
on households of four persons and on a reduction in the population figures for the large right bank-parishes from 
the population figures given by the 1767 pouillé proportional to the populations of Paris c. 1430 and c. 1730 – 
generously 1/3. This presumes that the right-bank parishes of the city were densely populated in the fifteenth-
century, as much of the subsequent expansion in population from 100,000 to 600,000 residents occurred in outly-
ing districts. Dividing by 6 doubles the percentages to give a range of from 13.5% to 48% households touched by 
excommunication. 
30 Toussaert, Sentiment religieux, S. 442. 
31 Beaulande, Malheur d’￪tre exclu, S. 196. 
32 Paravy, Chrétienté romaine, S. 462-466. 
33 Paravy, Chrétienté romaine, S. 483-484; BN lat 10930 (Formulary for the Officiality of Le Mans, 1429), f. 12v-
13: “quo modo presbiter debet absoluere morientem in articulo mortis: 
  Dominus noster episcopus X per suampiissimam mram te absolvat Et ego auctoritate omnipotentis dei et petri 
et pauli apostolorum eius et domini nostri pape G divini providentie pape xi in hac parte in commissa ab omnibus 
peccatis tuis de quibus fuisti vos ore confessus et corde contritus eciam a sententia excommunicacionis si quam 
meministi steterit ut ignoranter et eadem auctorite et auctoritatibus quibus super do penam et culpam in quantum 
claves sancte matris ecclesie si extenduntur in nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti amen. 
Dispensatio ut corpus mortui excommunicati sepeliatur in terra sancta: 
Guido episcopus etc rectori etc si vobis constitit quod B tempore quo vivebat esset verus catholicus et 
quod dum in extremis laborabat signa penitencia apparuerit in eodem non obstante quod non recepit in extremis 
confessionem p/ et eucaristie sacramentum super quibus tenore presencium nostre dispensamus corpus seu 
cadaver ipsius tradatur esse sepulture Datum etc.” 10 
 
piled for the officialités of Marseilles and Aix around 1490 concerned excommunication for 
debt suggests that the Pre-Reformation Church was in effect selling its salvific magic to 
lenders.
34 Such events encouraged ill feeling, detachment from the hierarchical Church, and 
even abandonment of the established Church. In mid-fifteenth-century Dauphiné, this meant 
recourse to an increasingly radical, separatist Waldensianism; in Europe after 1517, it meant 
a turn toward forms of Protestantism.
35 In addition to killing relations of trust between clergy 
and faithful, excommunication for debt poisoned communal relations at the same time as it 
filled a useful, otherwise unfulfilled economic function. Paravy offers examples of creditors 
accusing debtors, whose curses they feared, of witchcraft, and, in one case, of debtors ac-
cusing a creditor of witchcraft.
36 The sanctions designed to promote reverence for the 
Church’s precepts and jurisdiction could as well fissure as unify the sacramental community. 
Parish-by-parish lists of excommunicates, court records, accounts, formularies, and com-
plaints attest to the practice across France. The phenomenon appears to have existed in the 
British Isles, in Germany, and in Italy. One suspects that it was nearly universal. 
 
Demand for Excommunication for Debt 
Excommunication for debt illuminates an aspect of canon law and of the operation of church 
courts often absent from histories of canon law and church courts. Because historians of 
canon law often concentrate on learned treatises or on procedural prescription and because 
social historians prefer to mine legal records for information about family life, one does not 
often encounter an examination of the role of custom in medieval church courts. To put the 
matter differently, a study of excommunication for debt shows us how church courts were not 
simply instruments of evangelization by citation but in fact responded to very real demand on 
the part of believers, particularly with respect to their civil competence. 
What those believers demanded was in fact authentication of contracts – both written and 
unwritten! Olivier Guyotjeannin has proposed that the crystallization of officialities as bureau-
cratic institutions in the years around 1200 (at least in France) responded to the pressures of 
considerable lay demand for the authentication of written contracts with the seal of the offi-
ciality – for, to use the terminus technicus, its juridiction gracieuse.
37 What my study of the 
records of excommunication for debt reveals is that lay demand for the enforcement of un-
written contracts composed a considerable proportion of the activity of church courts from the 
late thirteenth century. Synodal statutes from the diocese of Coutances prior to 1294 specify 
that parish priests were to keep a “table or sheet on which he write the names of the excom-
municates of his parish, and for which causes, and how many times, and at whose request, 
and by whose authority.”
38 This suggests that the practice had become quite common, more 
so than would be the case for ordinary ecclesiastical offences. Matters of debt are present in 
formularies of the officiality of Tréguier dating from c.1312-1315.
39 As in the documents from 
Coutances, the archidiaconal officiality of Chartres appears to have kept parish-by-parish 
lists of excommunicates (without specification of cause) from the early 1340s at the latest.
40 
By the early fourteenth century, officialities kept registers that specified when, at the request 
                                                           
34 Paravy, Chrétienté romaine, S. 463-464: Les Adrets, 2,500 florins / 3,333 l.t.; Aubenas, Recueil. 
35 Paravy, Chrétienté romaine, S. 750-751. 
36 Paravy, Chrétienté romaine, S. 824-825. 
37 Olivier Guyotjeannin, Juridiction gracieuse eccl￩siastique et naissance de l’offiialit￨ ￠ Beauvais (1175-1220), in: 
A propos des actes des évêques: Hommage à Lucie Fossier, Nancy, 1991, S. 295-310. 
38 Concilia Rotomagensis provinciae accedunt diocesanae synodi… , Rouen, 1717, S. 543-559, at 545, c. 15. 
39 Formulary of the Diocesan Officiality of Tréguier, c. 1312-1315, BnF, Nouvelles acquisitions latines 426. 
40 Registers of the Officiality of Chartres, bound in Register of Excommunicates from the 1340s, Archives Depar-
tementales de l’Eure-et-Loire, Chartres (henceforth ADEL), G 813. 11 
 
of whom, for what cause, often for what amount a believer had been excommunicated, and, 
ideally, when he had been absolved.
41 
These registers are indispensable to the history of the practice, as are financial accounts and 
formularies. Excommunications for debt were primarily automatic consequences of a failure 
to appear in response to a citation, that is, for contumacy in response to an oral citation. The 
matter does not therefore often appear in surviving registers of the audiences of officialities. 
Only when the cited party appeared at the officiality to acknowledge or to contest the debt do 
such matters appear in the registers of audiences. Then, the judge could hear debates “on 
the probative value of an account” (super agnitionem cedule) if written proof existed or record 
the recognizance of a debt, marked “Obligation” (obligatio) or “Recognizance” (condempna-
tio) in the margin.
42 
The use of spiritual sanctions to enforce debt was a practice conducted, not necessarily off 
the books, but off the books that historians ordinarily examine. A creditor had simply to come 
to an auditor of the officiality and allege an unpaid debt. For this, the auditor would command 
a sergeant (often a proctor of the officiality) to cite the defaulting borrower, usually only once. 
At times, as in the accusation against the bishop of Orléans with which I began, it appears 
that sergeants or proctors were sometimes sent out to sell written citations. When they 
passed through a village and encountered someone who wished to collect an unpaid debt, all 
that had to be filled in was the names and the date, left blank on the already-sealed cita-
tion.
43 All this would appear in the accounts of the officiality, the register of excommunicates, 
and perhaps in a sort of aide-mémoire for the summoner. At Paris, the latter were five-
centimeter long scraps of parchment containing laconic instructions: e.g. “Cite Jean X, exec-
utor of Jean de Crois, dwelling in the rue Saint-Honoré, in the court of the Lord Archdeacon 
of Paris on Wednesday at the request of Gérard Raundat, OP, to respond in justice / 
[Signed] Germanet.”
44 Furthermore, The provision of the Ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts 
(1539) that citations be written and their cause be specified is clearly a response to this – as 
is its restriction of the citation of layfolk in non-spiritual matters.
45 When the cited believer 
failed to appear before the official, whether because he had failed to hear the citation or be-
cause he had chosen to flout the “spiritual sword,” he was automatically excommunicated 
and his name was enrolled upon the officiality’s register of excommunicates. His name would 
                                                           
41 Essentially all of the excommunicates at Montivilliers (1499-1530) were absolved, while only 41% at Paris 
(1426-1439) are recorded as having been absolved. This could reflect a higher number of long-term, obdurate 
excommunicates but more likely reflects the sloppy record-keeping of the archdiaconal officiality. 
42 e.g. AN Z
1o8, f. 36v, 15 may 1500; AN Z
1o4, f. 6v, “Cond.”, Sabbati post festum bte marc evangeliste, 1477: 
“Hodie henricus planche citatus… ad requestam luquini de fucheres actoris confessus fuit debere contenta in 
peticionem alias redacta / quam sommam promisit solvere infra festum penthecostes;” f. 7, “Oblig.”: “Hodie Jaco-
bus Jolin laborator apud chanveriacum confessus fuit debere magistro guillelmo de lorrano presbytero curato 
ecclesie parrochialis sancti petri ad boves in civitate parisiis summam duodecim francorum ii s p / Racione veri 
mutui per dominum creditorem eidem johanni facti diversis vicibus a duobus annis citra / quam summam promisit 
solvere videlicet quadraginta s infra festum assumcionem beate marie virginis / quadraginta solidorum in festo 
sancti martini / xl
ta s in festo assumpcionis inde sequenti anno lxxviii
o et residuum in sequenti festo sancte martini 
hyemali sub pena excommunicacionis etc Et fuit monitus ut in forma Et eligit suum domicilium in loco predicto / ii
o 
s / cred.” 
43 Febvre, Excommunication, pt. II: 5. 
44 Insert in Z
1o5, Register of Civil Cases of the Archdiaconal Officiality of Paris, 1479-1480: “Cit[etis] in cur[ia] 
d[omi]ni archid[iaconi] par[isiensis] ad diem mercurij / joh[ann]em ______ execut[orem] joh[ann]is decrois / com-
mor[antem] in vico s[an]c[ti] honorati super [requestam] girardi / raundati ord[inis] frat[rum] p[redicatorum] quod 
justum r[espons]urus / germanet.” 
45 Isambert et al., Recueil général des lois, Paris, 1821-1833), XII: 600-640. Art. 1-4, pp. 601-602, restrict church 
courts to purely spiritual matters and bar them from trying personal actions between layfolk or from delivering 
verbal citations. 12 
 
have been struck when he had renegotiated with or paid his creditor and had paid the sealing 
fee for his absolution. Appropriately enough, it appears that proctors summoned on credit 
and that the sealer sealed absolutions on credit.
46 This only makes sense, as citations likely 
reflected a need for ready cash on the part of the lender or seller. In a time of pressing need, 
these may not even have had the pennies with which to pay the summoner. Indeed, it makes 
little sense to distinguish between creditors and debtors, as nearly everyone was both. 
Whether one appeared as one or the other depended largely upon the credit of others. If one 
of your creditors called in your debt, you were a debtor. If you called in the debt of one of 
your borrowers, you were a creditor. 
When one analyzes registers of excommunications, one comprehends the magnitude of the 
practice. I will explored that of the diocesan officiality of the archdeacon of Chartres from 
1380 to 1434, that of the archdeacon of Paris from 1426 to 1439, and that of the abbess of 
Montivilliers in Normandy from 1499 to 1530. For Paris, I have compiled a database of 3,069 
entries. Since the archdeaconry primarily covered the right bank parishes of Paris and adja-
cent villages, most of the excommunications concern the commercial heart of Paris. Sadly, 
this register does not always specify the amount at the base of a given excommunication, 
because many were the outcome of a failed citation rather than actual litigation. Of 3,069 
citations, 1,889 or 62%, were for simple contumacy (pro contumacia) as opposed to 433 or 
14% for an (adjudged) amount (pro re [judicata]) reflecting either a debt confessed in court or 
a written obligation sealed by the officiality or perhaps by the Châtelet and 43 or 1.4% for 
both contumacy and a sum. 29 or 1% were for court costs. 116 or 4% were for court costs 
and contumacy. The distribution among years was fairly regular. From 1426 to 1438 inclu-
sively, an average of 211 excommunications were registered in the archdeaconry of Paris. 
Excluding the peak years of 1429 (292 excommunications), 1434 (345), 1435 (300), and 
1437 (275), the average is 170. However, there remain 184 excommunications for which it is 
unclear whether they were issued in 1427 or 1428.
47 Depending on the distribution, including 
these would raise the overall average and push those two years into the range of the peak 
years previously mentioned. This is a considerable number. Over the slightly more than thir-
teen years covered by the register, one member of between 6.5 and 24% of the households 
of the big right-bank parishes had been excommunicated. It is true that a few of these were 
for moral cases and that a small minority of these excommunications were incurred by “re-
peat offenders.” Ecclesiastical justice nevertheless played a considerable and evident role in 
minor credit in late medieval Paris. 
The late 1420s and 1430s were difficult years for Paris. The Hundred Years War continued 
to afflict a divided France. Following the bloody entry of the Burgundians and English into 
Paris in 1418 and the deaths of Henry V and of Charles VI in 1422, the Regent Bedford and 
the young Charles VII struggled for control of France.
48 While the victories of Joan of Arc 
turned the tide in 1429, it was not until 1436 that the French regained Paris. The following 
table compares the numbers of excommunicates with grain prices in sous/setier, suggesting 
some correlation between price movements and excommunications.
49 
                                                           
46 Hence the predominance of court officers as excommunicators, particularly at Paris, where they constituted 
39% of the excommunicators. 
47 There are also 26 excommunications for 1439, obviously an incomplete listing, and 30 for which the date is 
unclear. 
48 Guy Fourquin, Les campagnes de la region parisienne à la fin du Moyen Âge du milieu du XIIIe siècle au début 
du XVIe siècle, Paris, 1964. 
49 Unfortunately, the price series begins in 1431 and the register ends in 1439. See Richard and Margaret 
Bonney’s European State Finance Database, http://esfdb.websites.bta.com, drawing on Micheline Baulant, Le 
prix de grains à Paris de 1431 à 1788, in: Annales ESC (1968), S. 538-539. The excommunication numbers lag 13 
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Exc  160  292  163  201  157  175  345  300  208  275  159     
Grain
n 
      2.76  2.25  5.50  1.89  1.37  1.68  4.06  5.95  4.18  1.17 
Though the years between 1426 and 1439 were certainly atypical years, comprehending the 
political, social, and economic dislocations of war, it does not appear that daily life ground to 
a halt according to the records of excommunication. Indeed, how could it? The inhabitants of 
this metropolis of 80,000 to 100,000 needed to provision themselves. This is why the Paris 
records are studded with tradesmen, women including female merchants, and a few high-
level bankers and merchants. These last included Master Jean de la Poterne, goldsmith, 
moneychanger, and twice échevin of Paris, who was probably particularly vulnerable. Ex-
communicated sixteen times, and only twice by the official’s prosecutor and once by his re-
ceiver of fines, Master John was probably at the center of a considerable network of lending 
and borrowing and surely faced the extraordinary financial demands both of office and of a 
wealthy subject vulnerable to demands for forced loans from royal officials or magnates. 
Though it appears that he often could not pay immediately when others called in his debts, 
he nevertheless retained great “credit,” given his position. Conversely, Jean le Queux proba-
bly issued numerous small loans, as he excommunicated others sixty-four times, putting him 
in a range that ranks him with the summoners of the officiality. Women are important among 
the mass of excommunicators and excommunicates. This includes married woman author-
ized to act legally in their own name, female merchants (marchandes publiques), and mar-
ried women excommunicated together with their husbands. Since excommunications were 
ordinarily directed not at the individual but at an economic cell, husbands and wives were 
excommunicated together as “X and his wife Y.” Interestingly, one encounters quite often 
that “Y wife of X and her husband are excommunicated.”
50 This suggests that the former 
formulation reflects debts contracted by the husband and the latter debts contracted by the 
wife. This is reasonable, since I propose that excommunication for debt principally concerned 
minor sums, as women would necessarily have been involved in market relations, even if not 
directly in the labor market, as many of them would also have been. It is likely that women’s 
economic participation was broadest at the bottom of the social scale, where survival de-
pended on each additional denier and on the credit of the couple as a unit – or perhaps even 
more on the wife’s credit with the baker, butcher, and tavern keeper.
51 
The sixteenth-century transformation of ecclesiastical justice is invisible in the the mid-
fifteenth century register of the archdeaconry of Paris, which probably records the practice at 
its peak. In it, we find an oscillation between off-peak years of 170 excommunications per 
year and peak years of 300 excommunications per year – a considerable figure. When we 
again find a relevant source, the accounts of the archdeaconry of Paris from March 1, 1494 
(NS) to February 28, 1495 (NS), it appears that the overall number of excommunications had 
declined from the mid-century level. Out of a total income of 481 l. 10 s. 5 d. par., citations 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the prices, as the former reflects the old-style year beginning at Easter and the latter have been regularized to the 
new-style year beginning January 1. 
50 e.g. AN Z
1o17, f.44, (1438, parish of Saint-Paul): “Excommunicati sunt uxor Johannis anglici et eius maritus ad 
instantiam guilloti cruel [pro] contumacia / absoluti mediante cessionis [bonorum].” Jean Langlois and his wife 
ceded all their property to Guyot Cruel, probably in a matter of some kind of debt.  
51 One is tempted to retroject Hufton, Poor of Eighteenth-Century France, but might consult Bronislaw Geremek, 
The Margins of Society in Late Medieval Paris, Cambridge, 1987. 14 
 
brought in 19 s. 11 ½ d., general monitions and so on 1 l. 14 s. 10 ½ d., and absolutions 9 l. 
5 s. 9 ½ d. These were not enormous sums in comparison to the two largest items in the 
archdeacon’s income, fines of 74 l. 1 s. 8 d. (15.3%) and payments on the occasion of visita-
tions of 206 l. (42.8%), but did help to provide 187 l. 3 s. 5 ½ d. of profit to the archdeacon 
after the deduction of operating expenses. If we assume that a citation cost 4 d., as is likely 
and as it apparently cost in the late fourteenth century, at most 48 citations were issued, 
though the real figure is likely lower on account of the inclusion of the sealing fees for other 
types of letter in this category. Thirteen general monitions were issued at a cost of 1 s. each. 
42 absolutions were sealed for 4 s. each, as were 10 relaxations for 2 s. each.
52 The officiali-
ty’s profit from excommunication obviously came primarily from the fees for sealing absolu-
tions. In comparison to mid-century, when the officiality might have taken in between 34 and 
60 l. from between 170 and 300 required absolutions, the archdeacon received 9 l. from a 
maximum number of 52 or so required absolutions in 1494. 
Most of the financial benefit of the procedure accrued not therefore to the archdeacon but to 
the lender or seller who requested the excommunication. Indeed, if a citation only cost 4 d. at 
Paris, it was a particularly cheap means of recovering small debts and of repairing one’s 
credit or damaging another’s, particularly since the royal court of first instance, the Ch￢telet, 
was formal documentation. According to Julie Claustre, in 1488-1489 80% of imprisonments 
for debt at the Châtelet of Paris were in consequence of debts sealed by the prévôté of Paris; 
the remaining 20% were almost all in consequence of debts pursued by royal officers in the 
course of their offices.
53 Even if an obligation had been drawn up by notaries and sealed by 
the clerks of the Châtelet, enforcement was costly. Imprisoning a debtor for a day or two, a 
common strategy, would have cost 2 s. 8 d. alone, approximately the daily wage of a con-
struction laborer in 1500-1505 (2 s. 6 d.).
54 As a result, the debts pursued at the Châtelet 
were relatively large, with 71% for amounts greater than 50 s., 47% for amounts greater than 
100 s., and 4% for amounts greater than 1000 s.
55 If creditors chose to pursue their debts 
before church courts, the fees were lighter, the procedure quicker, and proof based on sworn 
testimony. At Paris in 1494 and at Sens in the early sixteenth century, to warn a borrower 
that he would be excommunicated if he failed to pay cost 4 d. Church courts were the best 
place to pursue minor debts that lacked written proof. At Chartres, the average debt recorded 
was 25 s.t. and the median 10 s.t. At Paris, the average was 7.5 s.p. (9.375 s.t.) and the me-
dian 5 s.p. (6.25 s.t.) At Montivilliers, the average debt was 71.5 s.t., distorted by a number of 
large debts (the largest of 603 l. 5 s. 8 d.t.), as the median was only 30 s.t.
56 Barring the Par-
is data, which record the amount only of a few loans, the average debt pursued this way rose 
from a little over a pound tournois around 1400 at Chartres to just under 4 l.t. a century later 
in the commercial lands at the mouth of the Seine. The median, however, rose from half a 
pound tournois to only a pound and a half tournois. 
The following image of the database for the archidiaconal officiality of Paris, created with 
Gephi, an open-source network-visualization program provides another way of looking at the 
phenomenon. In spite of the paucity of amounts specified in the Paris data, it visually con-
firms the officiality’s involvement in private, civil, debt matters. 
                                                           
52 AN LL 517 n. 74. 
53 Julie Claustre, Dans les ge￴les du roi. L’emprisonnement pour dette à Paris à la fin du Moyen Âge, Paris, 2007, 
S. 171-193. 
54 Claustre, Geôles, 351; Micheline Baulant, Prix et salaires à Paris au XVIe siècle: Sources et résultats, in: An-
nales ESC 31:5 (1976), S. 954-995, 981. 
55 Claustre, Geôles, S. 213. 
56 ADEL G 817; Z
1o17; ADSM, G 5273, Register of the Excommunicates in the Officiality of Montivilliers, 1499-
1530. 15 
 
 
 
 
Each dot represents an individual or an economic cell and each line is line pointing from the 
requester to the excommunicate, the thickness of which reflects the number of excommuni-
cations passing from source to target. The size of the node signifies the number of excom-
munications made by that individual, on a logarithmic scale. The red sun at the center of this 
conceptual, not geographical diagram is the archdeacon’s prosecutor, the promotor justitiae. 
The arrows emanating from him represent the few excommunications given as punish-
ments,
57 excommunications incurred in the course of moral and civil litigation, as well ex-
communications in respect of debts reflecting court costs (pro suo salario). The grey ball at 
the far end of the center from the prosector represents the receiver of fines. The arrows em-
anating from him reflect his attempts to recover unpaid fines. Between then is a gray mass 
composed of the proctors of the court, frequent excommunicators, and those they excommu-
nicated. The proctors are there because they served the citations and, it appears, did so on 
credit. The arrows emanating from them probably represent efforts to reclaim unpaid fees. 
Frequent excommunicators are major small-time lenders, whether merchants, artisans such 
as bakers, or usurers – whose usury is of course invisible in the records of procedure predi-
cated on a view of lending as “amicable, interest-free loans” (ex amicabili mutuo). There are, 
of course, relatively few of these. Of repeat excommunicators (those with high OutDegree), 
nine of the eleven greatest are officers of the court, likely seeking to recover court costs and 
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their salaries. The band of potential (small-scale!) usurers probably extends from the five 
who excommunicated ten times to the two who excommunicated sixteen times. Of repeat 
excommunicates (those with high InDegree), no one was excommunicated more than thirty-
eight times, although the next most excommunicated two individuals were each excommuni-
cated twenty-one times. 
Number  InDegree  OutDegree 
0  1199  1632 
1  1252  993 
2  224  174 
3  98  48 
4  43  27 
5  34  10 
6  15  9 
7  17  3 
8  13  1 
9  3  5 
10  5  1 
11  1  0 
12  3  1 
13  2  3 
14  3  1 
15  0  0 
16  1  2 
17  1  0 
18  2  0 
19  1  0 
20  1  0 
21  2  1 (Proctor) 
22  0  1 
26  0  1 (Proctor) 
38  1  1 (Sealer) 
50  0  1 (Proctor) 
64  0  1 
65  0  1 (Proctor) 
85  0  1 (Proctor) 
91  0  1 (Proctor) 
130  0  1 (Receiver of Fines) 
599  0  1 (Promotor of Jus-
tice) 
Returning to the chart, the outer ring of nodes and edges (in network-analysis speak) is most 
important, for it represents what are overwhelmingly attempts to call in outstanding balances 
between private individuals. Since most of these reflect only one excommunication, we might 
interpret this outer ring as conveying the magnitude of minor credit in late medieval Paris, 
particularly since we only see breaks in networks represented here. The floating mass of 
credit on which society functioned is otherwise invisible. One might object that only 1289 
individuals were responsible for all 3069 excommunications and that 1722 individuals made 
up the totality of excommunicates (for those whose names are legible). This means that at 
least 1632 individuals in our sample never excommunicated anyone and that at least 1199 
individuals were never excommunicated. However, if one accounts for the activity of court 
officials, the balance is closer to even among excommunicates and excommunicated. From 
the evidence, most Parisians were creditors and debtors at the same time. 17 
 
This impression of the operation of church courts in matters of minor credit is confirmed by a 
later source from the Norman coast. The exempt jurisdiction of the abbess of Montivilliers 
between 1499 and 1530 covered parishes around the mouth of the Seine downstream from 
Rouen, including the port of Harfleur. The abbess’s ecclesiastical tribunal appears to have 
provided a valuable economic service in a region of high commercial activity. While at Paris 
the Ch￢telet may have stolen some of the archdeacon’s business, at Montivilliers only large, 
formally drawn up documents appear to have escaped the jurisdiction of the abbess of 
Montivilliers. In addition, the following chart testifies to the decline of instances of excommu-
nication for debt in the sixteenth century. 
The categories of registers of excommunicates suggest that the practice was driven by de-
mand, rather than by a standardized, top-down, doctrine-driven movement across Europe. At 
Paris, some excommunications for debt were recorded as “for an amount” or “matter” (pro re) 
or “for a confessed or adjudged amount” (pro re confessata or judicata), but the majority 
were recorded as “for contumacy” (pro contumacia). At Montivilliers, some excommunica-
tions came under the rubric of those “for contumacy,” but the vast majority were classed as 
being made “for an adjudged sum” (pro judicato summae). According to Véronique Beau-
lande, other Northern French officialities instead used the rather more explicit categorization 
of excommunications “for debt” (pro debito).
58 In England the category of “breach of faith” 
(fidei laesio) appears to have prevailed for the categorization of an action to recover a debt.
59 
Rather than reflecting a movement within canonical scholarship, the development of excom-
munication for debt appears to have responded to economic needs felt across the continent 
and satisfied through broadly similar canonical procedures. 
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Formularies consequently offer analogous if not identical formulas for letters of Nisi, citations, 
for excommunications, for cessiones bonorum, for aggravations, for reaggravations, and for 
absolutions or relaxations. Letters of Nisi are at the root of some excommunications, as their 
probative force was immediate. These letters sealed by the officiality included a clause 
providing for the excommunication of the borrower should he default. Again, however, it ap-
pears that many excommunications for debt lacked written proof, resting only on simple 
promises. The cessio bonorum was a procedure borrowed from civil or Roman law by which 
a creditor was absolved of his debts by renouncing all his property to his debtors.
60 This ab-
solution was not absolute, for the cessiones recorded in the registers of the audiences of the 
archidiaconal officiality of Paris specify that the debtor in question was only absolved until the 
debtor should come to a “richer life-situation” (pinguiorem fortunam).
61 Even having re-
nounced his property, the borrower remained in a sort of debt peonage, with his creditors 
preserving a claim to any future income or property should he escape his present misery. 
From the perspective of the creditor and the court, that was just, since the debtor had broken 
faith with another member of the body of Christ. 
A formulary compiled in the Breton diocese of Tréguier around 1312-1315, only a few years 
after the death of the canon lawyer Saint-Ives (1253-1303, diocesan official from 1284) con-
tains excommunication and citation formulas, some for heresy and some for debt.
62 Perhaps 
because of its age and its peripheral origin, its phrasing does not align with that of later for-
mularies, which refer either to mutua or charitable, interest-free loans or to legitimate sales. 
For example, the “protocol of letters in courts christian” (protocole d’expeditions qui se font 
en cour d’eglise ou officialité) of 1429 from Le Mans provides a template, “letter of citation for 
a monetary debt” (litera citatoria in causa pecuniaria), for the recovery of money lent “as a 
loan” (ex causa mutui) through the assignation of a term within which to pay on pain of auto-
matic excommunication.
63 The formulary (c. 1488) of the monastic officiality of Corbie like-
wise directs the “recognizance of a debt” (instrumentum recognitionis debiti) at money lent “in 
a friendly loan” (ex amicabili mutuo).
64 Illustrating how debts of consumption and subsistence 
might be at the root of an excommunication, the Le Mans formulary contains formulas for the 
recovery of “monetary debts contracted for the purchase of some bread or other item” 
(quamdam peccuniam… occasione panis vel alterius rei).
65 At Montivilliers in the first third of 
the sixteenth century, many underlying debts are explicitly to tavern keepers or “for expenses 
at a tavern.”
66 Because these reflected the credit on which commerce functioned and an of-
fense against the body of Christ, the late fifteenth-century style of the officiality of Corbie pro-
vided that these cases were to move quickly. Its “simple monition” (monicio simplex) provides 
that if the specified person failed to pay up “within five days… we would excommunicate him 
and declare him to be such.”
67 From a formulary of roughly 1529 from the diocese of Saint-
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Brieuc in Brittany, we learn that excommunication was a rapid remedy. The cited debtor was 
to be automatically excommunicated in “minor” cases, presumably the cases under 10 s. that 
did not require written citation, after eight days; in major cases, after fifteen days. Ten days 
after the excommunication, if the cited believer remained obdurate, his sentence was to be 
“aggravated.” Ten days after that, his sentence was to be “reaggravated.” Ten days after 
that, his family and tenants (if any) were to be interdicted or banned from the church.
68 After 
a year, all obdurate excommunicates were liable to prosecution as presumptive heretics.
69 If 
this seems harsh, the – admittedly late, c. 1529 – statutes of Saint-Brieuc did try to mitigate 
the practice. They forbade excommunications for sums of less than 12 d. and provided that 
excommunicates were to be recorded and reported at diocesan synods.
70 Major cases of 
debt, greater than 10 s. for ordinary folk and greater than 32 s. 6 d. (one mouton d’or) for 
exempt persons (= clergy?), required more formal and careful procedures than simple oral 
citation.
71 What is more, the presumption of authenticity was only applied to obligations 
sealed by the officiality.
72 Elsewhere, the 1474 Style of Corbie required that simple paper 
accounts (cédules) be acknowledged by the issuer to be valid proof of a debt.
73 In church 
courts, excepting documents ratified by the court itself, the Christian’s word was the basis of 
proof. On this basis, a matter of debt, certainly a breach of the bonds of credit that bound 
individuals to each other, became a matter of “contempt of Holy Mother Church” and led to 
the exclusion of the excommunicate and his family from the community of those seeking sal-
vation through Holy Mother Church – which was also the economic community within which 
that unlucky excommunicate subsisted. 
The formal aspects of excommunication for debt reveal a perverse aspect of late medieval 
economic life. The most minor, the most common debts were sanctioned most severely. With 
his eternal salvation at stake, the debtor who owed the present-day equivalent of a day la-
borer’s wage, say, $150, would be forced to mortgage his future to his creditors and ruin the 
credit with which he purchased his daily bread. Larger debts, those secured on real property, 
were instead brought before royal or other secular courts. For those, whose value often ran 
to the equivalent of a present-day home mortgage, say, $500,000, a defaulting borrower 
might risk his property and his body – though, as Julie Claustre has demonstrated, the obli-
gation corps et biens was not yet generalized at the end of the Middle Ages and imprison-
ment for debt was most often for only a day or two – but not his soul. Economic violence is 
often invisible or barely perceptible, as it is today. Excommunication for debt joins rack-
renting, sharecropping, and foreclosing on mortgaged property as the late medieval and ear-
ly modern means par excellence of expropriating landowning peasants and of keeping the 
lower classes financially bound to the rich. At the same time, it offered a cheap, effective 
remedy to poor creditors facing a pressing cash need, perhaps to pay taxes or tithes and 
seigneurial dues converted into cash payments. In the passage cited earlier, Rabelais’s 
Panurge described debt as that which bound the human race together in relations of charity. 
However, excommunication for debt allowed creditors to break those relations. Rather than 
praying for the health and welfare that would enable debtors to repay their debts, creditors 
could have them thrown out of the community in this world and potentially in the next. 
Whether this reflected malice or pressing need is inscrutable in the record. 
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The Supply of Excommunication for Debt 
While demand drove the practice of excommunication for debt, there were also supply-side 
factors. The late medieval crisis of landed incomes made judicial income an increasingly im-
portant component of the income of prelates who possessed powers of jurisdiction (potestas 
jurisdictionis). Guy Bois suggested with respect to the French nobility that the fourteenth- and 
fifteenth-century decline of landed incomes led nobles to throw their cards in with the ex-
panding royal state so as to secure a larger portion of the growing royal tax take.
74 Even after 
the economy had recovered in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries and the six-
teenth-century price revolution had become evident, nobles continued to seek additional 
shares of the surplus of agricultural production through the State’s welfare system for the 
privileged. Churchmen were not immune from the effects of this economic conjuncture, and it 
appears that the quantitative peak of excommunications for debt peaked in the fifteenth cen-
tury and diminished rapidly thereafter. Demand and supply coincided to favor the practice, 
until sixteenth-century price increases and the actions of European government worked to 
reduce both the supply of and the demand for ecclesiastical civil justice. 
Economic changes encouraged legal developments. Michèle Bordeaux has demonstrated 
that ecclesiastical incomes had barely reattained the levels of 1300 towards 1500.
75 Bor-
deaux cannot provide the breakdown of his incomes, since her sources, primarily tariffs of 
clerical taxation, do offer this. We must piece together the changing makeup of ecclesiastical 
incomes from the surviving, fragmentary accounts. These suggest that judicial revenue made 
up for the fall in landed income in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. At Grenoble, in 
1361, early in the late medieval crisis, a notary purchased the farm of the officiality for 500 fl. 
(666 l. 13 s. 4 d.t.) of entry fees and an annual payment of 300 fl. (400 l.t.) to the bishop. The 
annual payment was doubled from 1381 and attained 1400 fl. (1866 l. 13 s. 4 d.t.) by the 
mid-fifteenth-century, when, together with the revenues of the officialité foraine of Chambéry, 
farmed-out judicial revenue amounted to roughly 2,150 fl. (2,866 l. 13 s. 4 d.t.), or half of the 
bishop’s income. Though this fell in 1497 to 1,650 florins (2,200 l.t.), it remained 16% of the 
bishop’s income – of roughly 10,000 florins (13,750 l.t.).
76 At Grenoble, judicial income clearly 
peaked in the middle of the fifteenth century, at exactly the worst economic conjuncture of 
the century. 
The pattern for the much richer, and much more richly documented archbishopric of Rouen, 
is similar. Its unique series of accounts permits me to say that in 1378 55% (10,730 of 19,463 
l.t. total) of the archbishop’s income came from judicial business, in 1400 56% (6,216 of 
11,105 l.t.), in 1450 41% (1,175 of 2,876 l.t.), in 1501 37% (5,601 of 15,327 l.t.), in 1545 21% 
(6,641 of 31,277 l.t.), and an ever-diminishing percentage thereafter. Percentages are not the 
entire story, as the absolute amount of judicial income declined even as other sources of 
income grew. At Rouen, the Registre des excommuniés brought in 468 l.t. in 1378, 329 l.t. in 
1400, 13.5 l.t. in 1450, 44.9 l.t. in 1501, 11.1 l.t. in 1545, and .77 l.t. in 1591, before disap-
pearing entirely from the accounts.
77 If we assume parity of citations and absolutions and that 
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these cost as much at Rouen as at Paris (4 d.p. and 4 s.p., respectively), the figures imply 
1,755 citations in 1378, 1,234 in 1400, 51 in 1450, 168 in 1501, 42 in 1545, and 3 in 1591. 
This suggests that the officiality of Rouen met a need for the enforcement of minor, unwritten 
contracts that was increasingly met by royal courts and by more elaborate forms of credit. It 
is not coincidental that the functioning of the plaids à mace of the bailliage of Rouen grew in 
this period, as its records, preserved from 1483, demonstrate. The following chart of the rev-
enues of the archbishop of Rouen from 1378 to 1550 demonstrates the movement of landed 
income during the late Middle Ages and the sixteenth-century price revolution as well as the 
importance of judicial income in the fifteenth century. 
 
The black line is revenue. The red line is expenses. The blue line is judicial revenue. The 
dotted lines are a twenty-year moving average. The collapse after 1550 is due to the ab-
sence of and fragmentary nature of the data, rather than any real decline in the revenues of 
one of the two richest dioceses in France (the other is Narbonne). What is clear is that reve-
nue fell precipitously to its mid-fifteenth-century nadir before beginning an astonishing rise at 
the end of the century. Judicial revenue became proportionately more important in the fif-
teenth century, particularly after 1450 (here the moving average is not helpful). Finally, con-
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sidering the grayish line that represent the balance (revenue minus expenses), it is clear the 
archbishops of Rouen were turning a fine profit in the sixteenth century, even with the con-
siderable expenses of cathedral-building and increasingly frequent royal taxation weighing 
upon them. Like other prelates, the archbishops of Rouen benefitted through the recovery of 
prices and their considerable increase in the sixteenth century through direct seigneurial in-
come (the “temporalities”), tithes, annuities secured on their properties, other types of lend-
ing, and the revenue from vacant benefices – all of which were inflated by rising agricultural 
prices. For example, at Douai, assuming 1360-1370 as an index of 100, grain prices were at 
96 in 1390-1400, 130 in 1440-1450, 143 in 1490-1500, and 178 in 1510-1520.
78 At Paris, the 
price of a setier of wheat in 1431 was 2.76 sous, in 1450 .75 s., in 1500 1.09 s., in 1520, 1.69 
s., in 1550 4.15 s., and in 1600 a considerable 8.65 s.
79 In other words, taking 1431 as a 
probably inflated index of 100, the price of wheat per setier was 27 in 1450, 39 in 1500, 61 in 
1520, 150 in 1550, and 313 in 1600. While the recovery was slower than at Douai, at Paris 
we can see the immensity of the sixteenth-century price revolution, particularly with respect 
to the most important commodity. The figures from Rouen correspond to an increase of this 
magnitude. By 1550, judicial income was insignificant in the archbishop’s enormous income. 
For bishops of poorer territories, revenues appear to have recovered more slowly and less 
spectacularly. At Besançon in the Franche-Comté, Archbishop Claude de la Baume resisted 
the abolition of excommunication for debt six years longer than the other prelates of the 
Spanish Netherlands (1565-1571). This surprisingly late example reflects the relative poverty 
of the archbishop of Besançon, whose diocese otherwise brought him only 3,000 comtois 
francs (4,500 l.t.) annually. The 4,000 or 5,000 comtois francs of income from the seal would 
certainly have been welcome. An inquest launched by Philip II of Spain to investigate the 
practice estimated that the resulting legal fees drained the province of 40,000 to 80,000 fr. 
(60-120,000 l.t.) annually in the 1560s.
80 Even accounting for the wages of practitioners and 
the officiality’s operating costs, the bishop’s share of this was doubtless considerable in 
comparison to his minuscule landed income.
81 What was the effect of this on the ground? 
Philip II’s inquest offers some eloquent examples. For expenses of, as one of the witnesses 
specified, “prest… commandises de bestial, payement de despence de bouche faicte chieu 
les taverniers, responces pour debt d’aultruy, actions d’injures, payement de marchandises 
donn￩es ￠ cr￩dit et autres semblable cas,”
82 the regions’ parish priests testified to 85 ex-
communicates, to more than 200 excommunicates, even to 580 excommunicates within a 
particularly large parish.
83 Against a few perennially indebted – or perhaps perennially un-
lucky, given the proliferation of relations of credit – believers these sentences piled up: in a 
register of 1570, Lucien Febvre counted, within one quarter of an enormous parish, “98 pa-
rishioners… excommunicated in consequence of one citation; 18 by 2; 10 by 3; 3 by 4; 7 by 
5; 6 by 6; 1 by 8.” In another quarter, 70 were excommunicated as the result of one citation, 
“25 by 2, 7 by 3, 4 by 4, 7 by 5, 2 by 9, 1 by 12, and 3 by 13.” At Longechaux, Michel Gous-
sot was excommunicated 22 times, 14 for contumacy, his two sons twice each; Pierrot Reg-
nier was excommunicated 28 times, Claude Regnier 32 times!
84 Of course, the archbishop of 
Besançon would not have been able to profit from a booming business of citation, excommu-
nication, and absolution in civil matters had there not existed a considerable web of debt ty-
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ing his flock together. Even though Febvre’s exemplary numbers represent a late and excep-
tional metastasis of excommunications for debt, with the evidence from Chartres, Paris, and 
Montivilliers, they convey the ubiquity of minor, unwritten relations of credit. The demand, it 
seems, was great. The supply of ecclesiastical justice cannot be ignored in explaining the 
phenomen of excommunication for debt. 
The procedure’s effectiveness presupposed belief in the efficacy of the sacraments from 
which the excommunicated debtor was barred. As such, it generated complaints across 
Christian Europe and encouraged an attitude of detachment from the institutional Church that 
in some places aided the passage to Protestantism. In fifteenth-century England it was not 
unrelated to popular Lollardy; in the Dauphiné during the same time this indifference favored 
a more aggressively separatist Waldensianism.
85 Even when its prevalence did not lead di-
rectly to heterodoxy, it could produce violent, bitter responses. At Pirton in the diocese of 
Lincoln around 1446, twelve men forced the summoner and his clerk to eat the writ of ex-
communication they were about to serve, for which most were appropriately excommunicat-
ed.
86 As such men likely still sought salvation, their attitude to the institutional Church must 
have been complex, to say the least. It is not coincidental that the apparent peak of the prac-
tice in the late fifteenth century was followed by the reorganization of the spheres of ecclesi-
astical and royal justice in France and England and then by the Protestant Reformation. Both 
were clearly reactions to the type of Church that could offer this sort of civil remedy. 
A considerable number of believers were touched by the excommunication by debt. Some 
were ruined by it, ceding their meager property to their creditors in the hope of absolution, 
and some died excommunicate, denied the sacraments, burial in consecrated ground, and 
the hope of salvation that both guaranteed. As the projections from the Franche-Comté sug-
gest, it required a considerable number of excommunications to make real money. Thus in 
1494, each absolution brought the archdeacon of Paris six times as much (2 s.p.) as each 
citation (4 d.p.). At the metropolitan officiality of the archbishop of Sens, in the early sixteenth 
century, each citation cost 4 d.t. and each sentence 4 s. 6 d. A general monition cost 2 s. and 
an absolution 5 s. Each temporary absolution for testifying in court or pursuing a case cost 4 
s. 4 d., each absolution with the consent of the creditor cost 3 s. 10 d., and each single-day 
absolution was taxed at 12 d. for the first day and 5 d. for each subsequent day, with an addi-
tional 20 d. for the seal of the officiality and a further 20 d. for the official’s signet.
87 By 1583, 
however, demand had apparently dropped, for even with considerable inflation, a general 
monition from the officiality of the bishop of Auxerre cost only 15 d.
88 By then, as the example 
of Rouen demonstrates, such fees were essentially equivalent to rounding error on episcopal 
incomes and only came in, as my conclusion will suggest, in response to demand for a new 
type of use of the power of the keys in matters of property and violent crime. Up to the middle 
of the sixteenth century, however, believers continued to use spiritual sanctions in matters of 
debt. With no better choice, they were trapped between economic and religious imperatives. 
 
Transition: The Reformation and the Early Modern World 
Late medieval society was the Church, both a sacramental community constituted by collec-
tive rituals, as John Bossy has argued, and a juridical organization in which, to repeat the 
words of Paravy, receiving the Eucharist was as much a “privilege” granted by a legal author-
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ity as a sign of membership in a community.
89 The opportunity to participate in those rituals 
depended on prelates’ judgment and on the will of one’s creditors. Conversely, economic life 
was predicated to a degree on one’s participation in that sacramental community. With few 
exceptions, the sacramental community was the economic community with respect to local 
commerce. The redress of a situation in which creditors could potentially purchase the dam-
nation of borrowers flowed naturally from fifteenth-century calls for reform of the Church “in 
head and in members” stemming from the conciliar response to the Great Western Schism. 
They facilitated the sixteenth-century redefinition of the European jurisdictional landscape of 
which the Protestant Reformation was only one aspect. With the coming of Protestantism, 
church courts disappeared or so modified so as to be unrecognized. What is not commonly 
recognized is the degree to which church courts were remodeled in Catholic territories in a 
process that began well before the Protestant Reformation. 
In France, royal officials mobilized accusations of abuses of excommunication against eccle-
siastical justice, as in the example with which I began. That particular dispute came before 
the Parlement of Paris through an appel comme d’abus, a procedure that permitted appeals 
from church courts to royal courts. Developed in the late 1440s to enforce conciliar reform 
decrees, over the next century the Parlement extended the procedure’s scope into what was 
effectively appellate review of the decisions of church courts.
90 Its frequency increased 
sharply in the late 1520s, when the emergence of Protestant heresy impelled the king’s judg-
es to more aggressive intervention in the ecclesiastical realm. Royal legislation too ad-
dressed the perceived abuses of church courts: for instance, in 1539 the first articles of the 
famous ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts were targeted at perceived abuses of ecclesiastical 
sanctions.
91 The Church also reformed itself, perhaps too late: in 1594 the provincial council 
of Avignon forbade excommunication for sums less than 20 écus (60 l.t.) and in 1609 the 
council of Narbonne forbade excommunication for sums smaller than 20 l.t. However, in 
1601 the Parlement of Paris had declared an excommunication for 33 l.t. abusive.
92 These 
high sums would have barred church courts from trying matters of daily credit, illustrating the 
slow adoption of the provisions of the ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts, at least in Southern 
France. These conciliar canons imply that excommunication for debt was viewed as an un-
acceptable use of spiritual sanctions. By 1600, debt litigation had mostly passed to royal or, 
in the case of the Parisian Merchants’ Tribunal, semi-royal justice.
93 In the seventeenth cen-
tury, church courts remained, though their competence was essentially restricted to the état 
civil or matters of baptism and marriage, and clerical discipline, including turning criminals in 
major orders over to royal justice. Their judgments were subject to the review of royal courts. 
The law on which they functioned was shaped by the king’s legislation and the decisions of 
his courts.
94 
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Elsewhere in Europe, similar movements were afoot. In England, from the late fifteenth cen-
tury, the use of writs of prohibition to bar courts Christian from hearing debt cases increased. 
In common-law courts, actions of trespass were expanded to comprehend new species of 
contract and debt.
95 From the middle of the century, borough courts stepped in to provide a 
cheap, effective means of enforcing minor, quotidian credit. As in France, the spread of writ-
ten obligations and credit arranged by attorneys (notaries in France) helped to replace older 
forms of purely oral obligation, though not completely. In the Catholic Franche-Comté, the 
Regent Margaret supported the Parlement at D￴le in its ultimately successful “battle against 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction.” The Parlement of the Franche-Comté had unsuccessfully resolved 
in 1532 to forbid excommunications in matters concerning less than ten francs (15 l.t.).
96 This 
demand was reiterated in the 1550s and lay behind the drive to implement the provisions of 
the Council of Trent in the 1560s and 1570s. However, as Febvre put it: “to suppress to use 
of excommunication in temporal matters, in matters of debt would be to suppress the officiali-
ty itself” and to ruin the town of Besan￧on fed by that spiritual commerce.
97 The jurisdiction 
withered after the practice was suppressed in 1572, though not after enriching a few arch-
bishops, scores of legal practitioners, and, Febvre argues, a whole class of expropriating 
bourgeois who used the officiality of Besançon to enforce their usurious loans. 
Even as the economic incentives for prelates disappeared and as the civil competence of 
officialities disappeared in response to the reforms of secular rulers, the Council of Trent re-
duced the number of clergy who lived from the revenue of ecclesiastical justice by limiting 
recourse to excommunication and by reducing the autonomy of exempt ecclesiastical institu-
tions, chapters, and archdeacons.
98 However, neither conciliar canons nor canonical doctrine 
lay behind either the origins or the disappearance of the practice of excommunication for 
debt. One might search in vain through the learned commentaries of medieval jurists for a 
discussion of the practice and find nothing but weak justifications based on “breach of prom-
ise” (fidei laesio) or the covenantal value of a simple promise aside. One finds abundant dis-
cussions of usury but mostly oblique discussions of excommunication for debt, as when Guil-
laume Durand (c.1230-1296) stated c.1271-1272 that an excommunicate could be absolved 
at the request of his creditor even had he not paid, because “satisfaction is whatever the 
creditor shall wish.”
99 Though jurists and theologians loved to discuss usury, it was rarely a 
matter for church courts. Debt, in fact, was rarely a matter for church courts in the sense that 
it was not often litigated. As we have seen, and as the rareness of matters of debt in the reg-
isters of court audiences and its frequency in registers of excommunicates suggests, ex-
communications for debt were most often the automatic results of citations. Citations were 
not issued in formal hearings, excommunications came automatically, and relaxations or ab-
solutions came from the notaries and sealer of the court. The whole procedure took place off 
the books, in a sense. 
What this suggests is that this particular competence was only of interest to prelates pos-
sessing rights of jurisdiction at a particular, circumscribed conjuncture, for only in great quan-
tities did it provide a reasonable profit to church courts. As such, it was important at the worst 
of the late medieval crisis of landed incomes. Before and after, it was less important. Whence 
the demand for the procedure? We can securely identify two potential sources: ordinary peo-
ple facing credit crises and those like the usurious bourgeois of Besançon, the latter akin to 
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those who purchased annuities from peasants so as to foreclose on their farms.
100 The for-
mer are probably more important to the proliferation of excommunicated debtors. Excommu-
nication for debt was certainly an abuse, the stakes out of proportion to the penalty. And yet 
everybody lived by credit. In this sense, the practice fulfilled an important function. In a period 
in which small coinage was scare, in which credit was a social, moral, and economic quanti-
ty, and in which secular rulers did not concern themselves with minor debt, church courts 
allowed for the easy exchange of unwritten credit because a man’s or a woman’s word was 
always secured, in final analysis, on his or her eternal soul. The practice reveals more about 
late medieval religion than we might imagine, for the inverse of recognizing that credit was a 
social, moral, and economic concept is to recognize that the sacramental community was 
also an economic entity. There was no “market” conceptually separate from society, only the 
“Body of Christ” within which Christians were saved. There was no FDIC, no Federal Re-
serve, no Consumer Protection Bureau, only the seigneurial, municipal, church, and royal 
courts. 
The rise and fall of excommunication for debt therefore marks one aspect of the transition 
from the medieval to the early modern European world, from a conceptually unified Western 
Christendom to a Europe of territorial polities riven by religious differences. The reformation 
of the law undertaken by princes during Europe’s long Reformation (1400-1700) reconfigured 
the jurisdictional relationships within their territories. In Catholic lands, canon law stood, but 
increasingly only insofar as tolerated or modified by the legislation of the local ruler. After 
1500-1550, canon law was less a competing source of practical law than a restricted body of 
law governing a particularly circumscribed area, usually baptisms, marriages, and sometimes 
wills. This reformation of the law reduced the supply, so to speak, of excommunication for 
debt. It did so through limits on the amounts for which a Christian could be excommunicated, 
through the organizational reforms of the Council of Trent that aimed to make bishops more 
powerful over archdeacons and exempt clergy, and through the efforts of secular courts to 
offer new forms of civil justice, particularly in matters of debt. By 1600, the king’s law was 
paramount in France, as the Common Law had secured its predominance over other forms 
of law in England. The withering of excommunication for debt signals the emergence of early 
modern juridical orders across Europe. The threat of excommunication survived in different 
forms, but primarily for moral cases. Only in France did general monitions persist after the 
end of the sixteenth century.
101 Until the end of the Old Regime (and in two instances under 
Napoleon) the state found it useful to have priests threaten witnesses who did not disclose 
what they knew of a crime with excommunication. 
Excommunication for debt points to another transition as well, the economic transition that 
goes by many names: “the transition to capitalism,” “the sixteenth-century price revolution,” 
“the age of first empires,” “the age of civil litigation,” and even “the Renaissance.” In other 
words, the practice stands athwart the medieval and early modern economic worlds, the in-
tegration of local, primarily face-to-face economies into regional economies. In these, rela-
tions of trust were less certain and knowledge of one’s borrowers was difficult to come by, 
even as relations of credit grew increasingly necessary to commerce and even to subsist-
ence. Excommunication for debt helped to extend the community of trust, for in a Christian 
community all were bound by the hope of salvation. It may have made small-scale credit effi-
cient, since the monetary cost of the practice was small though its emotional and religious 
cost may have been considerably greater. In England, where actions of assumpsit and other 
forms of trespass supplanted excommunication for debt in the sixteenth century, secular 
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courts faced a surge of litigation. Doubtless this reflected mid-century commercial develop-
ment, as Craig Muldrew proposes on the basis of probate inventories, but it surely also re-
flected the disappearance of the civil jurisdiction of church courts. By 1550, pleas of debt 
were not entered in beleaguered church courts. Across the Channel, while it appears that a 
few actions to recover debts remained before French officialities, the bulk of civil litigation 
passed into royal courts, whose caseload increased enormously over the century. It is never-
theless possible that here lies one of the origins of the divergence between France and Eng-
land, for annuities (rentes constituées à prix d’argent) were not the negotiable, flexible in-
struments of credit contested in Muldrew’s borough courts. Even though large “merchants 
were obliged to convert unrecoverable debts into annuities,”
102 this possibility was not viable 
for small debts to many different individuals, but only for repeated transactions on credit with 
a single individual. Because of the deeper penetration of Romano-canonical thinking about 
obligations, the disappearance of the civil competence of church courts in matters of debt left 
French subjects legal recourse only for expensive, written obligations.
103 
The emergence of officialities signals the quickening of commerce at the end of the twelfth 
century. The visibility of excommunication for debt by the end of the thirteenth century prob-
ably reflects further commercial expansion coupled with the strains of overpopulation, eco-
nomic inefficiencies (from currency manipulation and peasant indebtedness to the lack of 
other effective remedies), and the need for prelates to supplement their declining incomes. 
The withering of the practice represents the acceptance of the state as guarantor of credit. It 
is perhaps a forerunner of the transition detected by Michel de Certeau in the mid-
seventeenth century, when the organizing categories of society shifted from religious to polit-
ical ones.
104 As the appearance of excommunication for debt in the fourteenth century sig-
nals a failure of private forms of guarantee for credit (pledges etc.), its virtual disappearance 
by the end of the sixteenth century signals the acceptance of the state’s economic role. Mi-
chael Breen recently wrote, drawing on Julie Hardwick, that “the early modern French state 
was less a concrete entity than a claim to authority, one that ordinary French men and wom-
en readily borrowed to organize and to maintain the structures of daily life.”
105 Excommunica-
tion for debt is the transition between private guarantees of debt and the state’s “public” 
guarantees. In the sixteenth century, changing religious sensibilities turned consumers – 
consumers of justice – away from the Church as a guarantor of contracts and toward the 
State. The state, it seems, had gained sufficient credit to begin its modern role as arbiter of 
the economy. Credit no longer rested on an individual’s hope of salvation but on the state’s 
guarantee of his or her property rights. 
 
                                                           
102 Schnapper, Rentes au XVIe siècle, S. 284. 
103 W. J . Zwalve, Sola scriptura, An essay in comparative legal history on ‘obligacions’ in thirteenth-century 
France and England, in: Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 80 (2012), S. 95-128; Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and 
Rosenthal, Priceless Markets. 
104 Michel de Certeau, tr. Tom Conley, The Inversion of What Can Be Thought and The Formality of Practices, in: 
The Writing of History, New York, 1988, S. 125-146 and 147-205. 
105 Breen, Law, Society, and the State in Early Modern France, in Journal of Modern History 83:2 (2011), S. 346-
386, at 384. 